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IS GUIDED DISCRETION SUFFICIENT? 
OVERVIEW OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
RICHARD S. FRASE* 
The purpose of these remarks is to provide a brief overview of state 
sentencing guideline systems—where they are, how they have evolved, and 
how they differ from each other and from the Federal Guidelines.1 
The idea of sentencing guidelines overseen by a permanent sentencing 
commission was originally proposed by federal judge Marvin Frankel in the 
early 1970s.  Several bills to accomplish this were introduced in Congress, but 
Minnesota was the first jurisdiction in the United States to place such a system 
in operation.  There is some irony that a federal judge first proposed this idea – 
not only were sentencing guidelines first adopted in the states, but many people 
 
* Richard S. Frase is the Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University of 
Minnesota.  An earlier version of this speech was delivered in Minneapolis on September 7, 1999, 
on the occasion of Professor Frase’s reappointment to the Berger chair. 
 1. The principal sources for this summary are: Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions 
and Their Guidelines, 17 CRIME & JUSTICE 137 (1993); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing 
Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173 (1995); Kevin R. Reitz, The Statute of 
Sentencing Guidelines Reforms in the U.S., 10(6) OVERCROWDED TIMES 1 (1999); and various 
state-specific reports and evaluations too numerous to cite, collected by the author.  (Many of the 
latter have been published either in the FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER, or in OVERCROWDED 
TIMES.  Additional information about particular state guidelines systems may be obtained from 
the contact persons listed on the web page of the National Association of Sentencing 
Commissions — http://www.ussc.gov/states/nascaddr.htm.  The Association’s newsletter, also 
available on this web page, reports recent state guidelines developments. Questions, comments, 
and factual corrections are very welcome, and should be addressed to Professor Frase at: 
frase001@maroon.tc.umn.edu. 
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believe that state guidelines have been much more successful than the federal 
version. 
As of late 1999, about one-third of the states had sentencing guidelines in 
effect, and guidelines reforms were being considered in a number of other 
states.  But, state guidelines systems are not all alike; some states have 
attempted to go farther than Minnesota, while many others have done much 
less. 
One of the themes I want to stress at the outset is that although state 
guidelines systems are very different from each in a number of the ways, they 
have a couple of things in common that distinguish them from the Federal 
Guidelines.  Across the board, I believe that state systems are more flexible 
than the Federal Guidelines.  There is a range among the state guideline 
systems.  Some state systems are so flexible that they are hardly “guidelines” 
at all, others are rather restrictive.  But anyone who thinks that sentencing 
guidelines are inherently inflexible and take away all discretion would be 
wrong. 
Another thing that distinguishes state guidelines is that they are relatively 
simple to apply.  The Federal Guidelines are quite ambitious; they try to 
structure and define every single decision.  This is related to the flexibility 
point, but it goes beyond that.  State guidelines are generally relatively short 
documents; sometimes very short.  The Minnesota guidelines commission, for 
one, has been explicit about the value of simplicity.  No matter how much we 
would like to regulate everything and no matter how many different goals we 
want to achieve, it is important to keep the guidelines relatively easy to apply 
and easy for courts, defendants, and the public to understand.  This is an 
important point that was lost in the federal system. 
In the remainder of these comments, I will examine the evolution, 
successes, and failures of guidelines reforms in Minnesota and other 
jurisdictions, and the lessons we can draw from twenty years of experience 
with state guidelines.  First, I will briefly describe the state guidelines reforms 
that have been proposed, adopted, and in some cases, repealed.  Next, I will 
examine the purposes which sentencing guidelines are intended to serve, how 
those purposes have evolved over time, and the extent to which state and 
Federal Guidelines reforms have achieved their various purposes.  Then, I will 
discuss several major limitations of guidelines reforms in all jurisdictions: the 
lack of effective controls over prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining 
practices and the very limited attempts to regulate or encourage the use of 
intermediate sanctions.  In spite of these limitations, however, I argue that state 
sentencing guidelines have proven to be much better than any other sentencing 
system which has been tried or proposed. 
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I.  WHERE, WHEN, AND WHAT KINDS OF GUIDELINES? 
A. Jurisdictions that have, once had, are considering, or have rejected 
“guidelines” 
As shown in the table accompanying these remarks, some form of 
sentencing guidelines is currently being used in seventeen states and in the 
federal courts.2  In addition, at least eight other jurisdictions (listed at the 
bottom of the table) are considering the adoption of guidelines.  Another 
important development was the adoption, in 1993, of the American Bar 
Association’s revised standards for sentencing (Third Edition).  These 
standards strongly endorse the adoption of sentencing guidelines incorporating 
all six of the key structural features listed in the table. 
Guidelines have suffered some defeats, however.  Although the number of 
guidelines systems has grown steadily, at least six states have considered and 
rejected the idea of sentencing guidelines.  Moreover, two states (Louisiana 
and Wisconsin) formerly had guidelines but then repealed them, and three 
other states have substantially weakened their guidelines.  Oregon voters 
approved a ballot measure that turned many of the recommended guideline 
prison sentences into mandatory minimum prison terms, and the legislature 
replaced the sentencing commission with a citizen “policy” board.  Florida and 
Tennessee abolished their commissions completely.  Moreover, Florida’s 
remaining “guidelines” no longer limit judicial severity: trial judges have 
complete discretion to impose any sentence between the recommended 
guidelines term and the statutory maximum.  Sentences below the guidelines 
still require a written statement of reasons and are appealable by the 
prosecution. 
B. Not all Guidelines are Alike — Major variations 
The accompanying table indicates some of most important structural 
differences among guidelines systems, but there are actually many more 
variations.  For instance, Delaware, Florida, and Ohio do not use a grid 
(although their “narrative” or “point-system” guidelines could be translated 
into a grid).  State and federal grids vary considerably in such things as: 
whether certain offenses have a separate grid; the number of grid cells; the 
breadth of cell ranges; and whether the ranges of adjoining cells overlap.  
Guidelines systems also differ in other ways, including: (1) the number of 
disposition options permitted for a given case (e.g., prison, jail, restrictive 
intermediate sanctions, etc.); (2) whether any guidance is offered as to the 
choice among sentencing purposes; (3) how criminal history is defined; (4) 
how multiple offenses are sentenced; and (5) the extent to which the 
 
 2. See Table 1. 
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sentencing commission has made independent judgments about appropriate 
sentences (so-called “prescriptive” rules), rather than simply compiling 
guidelines which are descriptive of past judicial and paroling practices. 
As shown in the table, three states’ guidelines lack a permanent sentencing 
commission. Alaska’s guidelines were created by statute, and have been 
greatly expanded by appellate caselaw.  As was noted previously, guidelines in 
Florida and Tennessee were written by commissions that were later abolished.  
Utah and three other states initially did not have a permanent sentencing 
commission.  State sentencing commissions vary considerably in their makeup, 
but most of them are larger and more widely representative than the federal 
commission (e.g., including attorneys and probation officers).  The duties, 
staffing, and budget of sentencing commissions varies a great deal.  An 
essential component of guidelines, however, is the idea of a commission that 
can do research on past sentencing practices, evaluate the use of resources, and 
prioritize the use of those resources.  Perhaps most importantly, the 
commission can predict and seek to avoid prison overcrowding (a function that 
I address below).  In short, a permanent sentencing commission is now 
generally seen as an essential component of a sentencing guideline system. 
Guidelines systems also differ greatly in their scope.  The most important 
differences relate to parole: six states (Utah, Pennsylvania, and the other states 
with “blanks” in the parole column of the accompanying table) retain parole 
release discretion for all offenses, and have only adopted guidelines to 
structure judges’ sentencing decisions.  Two states (Alaska and Michigan) 
retain parole for a substantial number of crimes.  A number of state guideline 
systems use parole only for a few, very serious offenses, usually those subject 
to life imprisonment.  Ohio retains a judicial releasing option.  Thus, abolition 
of parole release is apparently not seen as an essential feature of state 
guidelines, although it has become more common in recent years. 
Another important structural feature has to do with whether guidelines 
rules are legally enforceable — that is, binding on trial courts and subject to 
effective appellate review.  Six states (Utah, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, 
Arkansas, and Missouri) explicitly provide that their guidelines are “voluntary” 
and not subject to appeal.  In Pennsylvania, sentence appeal is available, but 
appeals have almost no impact due to the lax standard of review.  In North 
Carolina, the guidelines are very strict as to some sentencing issues, but very 
loose as to others, and there is almost no appellate caselaw.  Sentencing 
caselaw is limited in Tennessee, due in part to very broad guidelines ranges 
and retention of parole.  In Florida and Ohio, some decisions applying the 
guidelines are appealable, and some are not.  To summarize: effective appellate 
review is found in less than half of the state guidelines systems. 
The next column shown in the table indicates which jurisdictions have 
required their sentencing commission or some other state agency to assess the 
resource-impact of proposed sentencing guidelines and statutes, in particular, 
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the predicted effect on prison populations.  Impact-assessment is more accurate 
under guidelines, because guidelines sentences are more uniform and 
predictable.  Such assessment has always been a key feature of the Minnesota 
Guidelines, but it was lacking in most other early systems.  In later years, 
however, as state prison populations began to shoot up, increasing costs and 
raising problems of overcrowding and court intervention, more and more states 
began to see resource-impact analysis as an essential feature of guidelines. 
Indeed, increased prison population has been a major reason to adopt a 
guidelines system and a sentencing commission.  Almost every new guidelines 
system created since the mid-1980s has required resource-impact studies, and 
several older systems have added this feature.  It must be stressed, however, 
that guidelines systems use resource-impact studies in very different ways.  
Some, like Minnesota, use these studies to shape sentencing policy; if the 
impact projections show that a proposed guideline rule or statute will 
substantially increase prison populations, that proposal is likely to be rejected, 
or at least greatly narrowed in scope.  But other systems, such as the federal 
one, generally use resource-impact studies only after the rules have been 
written — that is, as a warning to the legislature to expand prison capacity in 
order to accommodate the new rules. 
The next-to-last column in the table shows which systems have attempted 
in some way to structure decisions on the use of intermediate sanctions — that 
is, sentences which are less severe than imprisonment but more restrictive than 
standard probation, such as residential or outpatient treatment, home detention, 
intensive supervision, drug- and alcohol-use monitoring, community service, 
restitution, and fines.  The earliest guideline systems only regulated prison 
decisions, that is, who should go to prison and for how long; non-prison 
sentences were left to the judges.  This is still true of Minnesota, where non-
prison sentences are given in almost eighty percent of felony cases (and where 
almost all jail sentences, which can be for up to one year, are not regulated by 
the guidelines).  This is a good example of how even a system that is a fairly 
ambitious about regulating discretion can still retain a lot of flexibility.  Since 
the mid-1980s, however, more and more guidelines systems have incorporated 
intermediate sanctions, and this is also recommended by the revised ABA 
standards.  This trend, like the growth in resource-impact analysis, probably 
reflects rising prison populations, and a desire to encourage judges to consider 
effective non-custodial sentencing options.  Nevertheless, only about half of 
existing guidelines systems attempt to regulate intermediate sanctions.  I will 
return to this topic later in these remarks. 
The far right-hand column in the table shows the systems that have 
guidelines to regulate misdemeanors as well as felonies.  Only five 
jurisdictions (and the ABA Standards) propose guidelines for misdemeanors 
(or at least, the more serious ones).  Perhaps surprisingly, there does not seem 
to be a strong correlation between the attempt to regulate intermediate 
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sanctions and the decision to promulgate misdemeanor guidelines — even 
though intermediate sanctions would seem to be especially appropriate for less 
serious cases.  Of course, there are also many inmates in state prison who are 
appropriate candidates for intermediate sanctions.  The judicial sentencing 
seminars conducted by Bob Levy at the University of Minnesota and by Mike 
Wolf at St. Louis University have been helping us explore these issues; the 
cases discussed in these seminars suggest that there are a lot of people in state 
prisons who really do not need to be there. 
Looking at the table as a whole, we can identify a number of “strong” 
guidelines systems — those with at least four of the key features referred to 
above.  These systems include Minnesota, Washington, Delaware, Oregon, 
Kansas, North Carolina, and the Federal Guidelines System.  At the other 
extreme are very “weak” systems — those with no more than two of these key 
features, such as Maryland (which recently reexamined its approach, but 
decided not to make any major changes), Alaska, and Tennessee. These 
variations do not necessarily mean that the weaker forms of sentencing 
guidelines are always wrong.  Perhaps a less ambitious guidelines reform is all 
that some states are able to enact.  Under such circumstances, it may be that 
some form of guidelines is better than none.  Moreover, several jurisdictions 
(e.g., Michigan and Virginia) began with weak guidelines, then substantially 
upgraded them.  On the other hand, weaker guidelines do appear to be more 
vulnerable to being partially or entirely repealed.  The two total-repeal states 
(Louisiana and Wisconsin) both had voluntary guidelines for judges, retained 
parole, and were missing at least one other key feature shown in the table.  The 
two states that abolished their sentencing commissions, Florida and Tennessee, 
were also both relatively weak systems.  Finally, it is not necessarily the case 
that relatively strong systems are always better.  As I will explain later in these 
remarks, there are a number of major problems with the relatively “strong” 
Federal Guidelines. 
II. THE CHANGING PURPOSES OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
What were the original goals of guidelines reforms, and how have these 
goals evolved over time?  The initial goals provide familiar but important 
background — we have to know where we have been, and how we got here, in 
order to evaluate the present situation and our options for the future.  In 
particular, we need to recognize when supposedly new sentencing reforms are 
actually just “re-runs” of old ideas — we do not want to make the same 
mistakes all over again.  At the same time, we also need to recognize that the 
goals of sentencing reform have evolved over time.  These changes show how 
guidelines have responded to new as well as old policy concerns, all of which 
must be accommodated in any successful sentencing system. 
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A. Initial goals: Reduced sentencing disparity, and more rational sentencing 
policy 
The initial goals of sentencing guidelines reforms were two-fold.  First, to 
reduce sentencing discretion and its resulting disparities; and second, to 
promote more rational sentencing policy developed and monitored by a 
specialized sentencing commission. 
The goal of disparity reduction was closely tied to a debate about the 
purposes that criminal penalties should be designed to serve.  Prior to adoption 
of sentencing guidelines, the dominant purposes of punishment were 
rehabilitation (seeking to change the underlying causes of the defendant’s 
criminal behavior) and incapacitation (preventing crime by confining 
dangerous offenders).  To achieve these goals, judges and parole boards were 
given extremely broad discretion to assess individually the rehabilitation 
potential and dangerousness of each offender.  Under this “indeterminate” 
sentencing system, judges could impose any sentence from probation to the 
maximum prison term authorized by law (e.g., twenty years for unarmed 
robbery).  Most systems required offenders to serve some fraction of their 
prison term before becoming eligible for parole; after that point, the parole 
board had unreviewable discretion to decide how much of the remaining 
sentence would have to be served. 
In the 1970s, a broad, “bi-partisan” consensus emerged that discretion in 
sentencing must be substantially reduced.  Unregulated discretion was seen as 
having failed to provide sufficiently certain and severe punishment to 
discourage crime and incapacitate dangerous offenders.  It also produced 
unjust disparities in the treatment of equally serious cases.  Studies were done 
which showed that when you gave a sentencing file to a group of judges they 
proposed very different sentences; it was not just that “each case is different.”  
Many people also came to believe that individualized assessments of each 
offender’s treatment needs, progress in treatment, and degree of dangerousness 
were too unreliable to justify the disparities they produced.  In addition, most 
treatment programs could not be shown to be effective.  Broad parole 
discretion also left both the public and prisoners themselves with no way of 
knowing how long imprisonment would last.  Some observers argued that the 
solution to all of these problems was a sentencing system based not on crime 
prevention, but upon retribution or “just deserts” — each offender should be 
punished in direct proportion to his or her degree of blameworthiness, with 
little or no consideration given to a defendant’s need for rehabilitation or 
incapacitation. 
The goal of achieving more rational sentencing policy has two facets.  
First, the use of an independent, appointed commission was designed to 
insulate sentencing policy decisions from short-term political pressures (and 
the tendency of elected politicians to prefer more punitive policies, so as not to 
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appear “soft on crime”).  Second, the commission, like other administrative 
agencies, was expected to collect data and develop expertise that would 
contribute to more informed sentencing policy.  The commissions’ database 
and expertise (and in Minnesota, its mandate to avoid prison overcrowding), 
was also expected to promote a more comprehensive, long-term, and fiscally 
responsible view.  By setting sentencing policy for all crimes (or at least, all 
felonies), guidelines systems could (1) avoid piecemeal reforms in response to 
the current “crime of the week,” (2) help manage more effectively the state’s 
prison capacity, and (3) set priorities for the use of limited correctional 
resources. 
B. Evolving goals 
Since Minnesota’s guidelines first became effective, sentencing goals and 
values in Minnesota and other guidelines jurisdictions have evolved 
considerably.  Of the original guidelines goals summarized above, it appears 
that the goal of disparity reduction has become somewhat less important, while 
other goals have become more important.  In order to achieve all of these 
goals, many state guidelines systems have, in effect, adopted a hybrid 
sentencing theory sometimes known as “limiting retributivism” (or as it is 
known in Minnesota, “modified just deserts”).  Under this approach, retributive 
or “just deserts” values merely set upper and lower bounds—sentences must 
not be either excessively severe or unduly lenient.  This theory thus defines a 
range of “deserved” punishments, within which courts may consider crime-
prevention, resource limits, victim and community concerns, and other 
appropriate sentencing goals.3 
The evolution in guidelines goals is evident in the accompanying table.  
For example, almost every guidelines system adopted or revised since the mid-
1980s has included resource-impact assessments, in an attempt to avoid prison 
overcrowding and control the growth of prison populations.  More recent 
guideline reforms are also more likely to regulate and encourage the use of 
intermediate sanctions.  Broader use of such sanctions is intended to reduce 
unnecessary prison use, thus avoiding prison over-crowding and reducing 
prison costs.  This approach is also intended to better promote public safety. 
Here are some of the other important goals that have been added or given 
greater emphasis as guidelines reforms have evolved over the past two 
decades. 
Truth in Sentencing.  Although this term has several meanings, the most 
common refers to the goal of ensuring that offenders serve a high percentage of 
 
 3. The theory of “limiting retributivism” is most often associated with the writings of 
Professor Norval Morris.  For a detailed analysis of the evolution of sentencing purposes in 
Minnesota, resulting in a system very similar to what Morris proposed, see Richard S. Frase, 
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUSTICE 363 (1997). 
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the prison sentence imposed by the court and are not released early by parole 
or prison officials.  In one sense, truth in sentencing was always part of 
sentencing reforms that included the abolition of parole release discretion.  But 
“truth in sentencing” has come to mean abolishing parole, period—whether or 
not judicial sentencing guidelines are enacted.  Moreover, the emphasis has 
shifted from disparity-reduction to systemic “honesty” and increased sentence 
severity.  Thus, whereas early guidelines combined with abolition of parole 
allowed offenders to receive a subsequent sentence reduction of up to thirty-
three percent for good conduct in prison, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—
and an increasing number of state sentencing guideline systems—define “truth 
in sentencing” so that offenders receive a sentence reduction of no more than 
fifteen percent for good conduct.  Adoption of this definition (and of guidelines 
which include abolition of parole) was strongly encouraged by a 1994 federal 
statute which provided substantial funds for prison construction to states that 
abolish parole and require inmates convicted of serious crimes to serve at least 
eighty-five percent of their sentences.4  At the same time, this statute has also 
encouraged some states to consider adopting guidelines.  The reason is that 
prisoners in their states were previously serving a very low proportion of their 
sentences (sometimes less than twenty percent).  With prisoners now required 
to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences, states are facing the 
prospect of massive increases in prison populations unless judges can be 
persuaded (via guidelines) to lower their sentence lengths. 
Public Safety.  As noted above, the original guidelines emphasis on “Just 
Deserts” represented a rejection of the prior policy of allowing judges and 
parole boards to make individualized assessments of each defendant’s risk of 
re-offending.  The goal of public safety was not completely abandoned, 
however.  Judges and corrections officials were still allowed to consider 
offender dangerousness when setting the conditions of probation or post-prison 
supervised release.  Moreover, recommended prison sentences under 
sentencing guidelines systems have always given substantial emphasis to the 
defendant’s prior record.  This factor has very little significance under a “Just 
Deserts” theory, which assumes that the defendant has already “paid” for his 
prior convictions.  The extent of the defendant’s prior record is primarily 
important as an indicator of his probable degree of dangerousness and 
amenability to treatment or supervision.  But guidelines systems prefer to make 
these assessments on the basis of group or actuarial risk, rather than 
individualized, case-by-case diagnoses.  Of course, guidelines systems that 
retain parole-release discretion allow case-specific dangerousness assessments 
of all imprisoned offenders. 
 
 4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796. 
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These limited forms of risk assessment and risk management were not 
enough, however, to satisfy judges, legislators, and the public.  In Minnesota 
and most other guidelines systems, public safety has become an increasingly 
important goal.  Thus, in 1989 the Minnesota Legislature amended the 
guidelines enabling statute to specify that public safety should be the 
Commission’s “primary” consideration, in enacting or modifying Guidelines 
provisions.  The Legislature has also enacted a series of laws authorizing or 
mandating increased penalties for certain dangerous or repeat offenders.  As 
for other states’guidelines systems, some explicitly included public safety as a 
goal (e.g., Ohio), and newer guidelines systems are likely to incorporate 
recidivist and  “dangerous offender” provisions, especially for sex crimes. 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration.  As with public safety concerns, 
rehabilitative goals were initially de-emphasized under most sentencing 
guidelines reforms, but they never went away entirely.  In some systems they 
remained quite important and may have increased in importance.  In 
Minnesota, for example, rehabilitation is a very important goal: the state is 
sometimes called the “land of 10,000 treatment centers” rather than “10,000 
lakes.”  Rehabilitation and reintegration (through community-based 
sentencing) are pursued by varying the conditions of probation.  Non-prison 
sentences are not regulated under the Minnesota guidelines and account for 
almost eighty percent of felony sentences.  In addition, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has held that, when judges are deciding whether to depart from 
presumptive prison or probation sentences, they may consider the defendant’s 
particular “amenability” to probation — a concept which at least implicitly 
includes assessments of rehabilitation potential (as well as public safety).  
Similar “amenability” concepts are found in the departure standards of other 
states’ guidelines systems, for example, in Ohio and North Carolina.  In 1993, 
the Minnesota Legislature also repealed the provision in the 1978 guidelines 
enabling act, which had required prison treatment programs to be entirely 
voluntary.  Corrections officials are now authorized to withhold “good time” 
credits from offenders who refuse to participate in prison programs. 
Restorative and Community Justice.  The past twenty years have witnessed 
a substantial growth in programs designed to give greater attention to the needs 
and perspectives of crime victims, the local community, or both.  Sentencing 
alternatives such as Victim-Offender Mediation, Restitution, and Community 
Service have become increasingly popular in Minnesota and other state 
guidelines systems.  Guidelines systems have yet to recognize formally such 
programs and sentencing alternatives, but as I will explain later in these 
comments, most systems readily accommodate these new ideas.  Again, if you 
have a more flexible guidelines system, it can incorporate a lot of different 
theories. 
Rewarding guilty pleas and other forms of cooperation.  All sentencing 
guidelines systems appear to recognize the importance of encouraging 
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defendants to cooperate by pleading guilty, providing testimony against other 
offenders, obeying conditions of probation, and maintaining good conduct in 
prison.  All of these forms of cooperation are “purchased” by giving 
defendants less than their authorized guidelines sentence.  Here again, 
competing, practical goals require a flexible rather than a strict conception of 
“just deserts,” that is, a theory of “limiting retributivism” which permits a 
range of penalties.  Plea-bargaining practices have not changed much under the 
Minnesota guidelines or, I believe, under most other state guidelines. A guilty 
plea, including an agreement of the parties about the most appropriate 
sentence, is a basis in Minnesota, and in most if not all state guidelines 
systems, to depart from the guidelines.  Of course, allowing such agreed 
departures risks undercutting the guidelines.  I will return to the this topic later 
in these remarks. 
Broadly-shared Sentencing Power.  Public officials and sentencing 
scholars have increasingly viewed sentencing as an exercise in shared 
authority, seeking to achieve a workable and stable balance between the roles 
and influence of a wide variety of public and private parties.  Lawmakers often 
view sentencing guidelines as a way to re-assert legislative control over 
sentencing (albeit indirectly, through the legislatively-appointed commission).  
Under indeterminate sentencing regimes, the input of lawmakers is limited to 
deciding what should be criminal the maximum penalty, and whether a 
mandatory minimum penalty should apply.  Similarly, trial judges often 
support sentencing guidelines which include abolition of parole. Under 
indeterminate sentencing, the judge’s sentence has very little effect over how 
long offenders stay in prison.  Well-designed sentencing guidelines can also 
provide appropriate policy-making and/or case-level roles for the sentencing 
commission, victims and community representatives, probation officers, and 
appellate courts.  On the other hand, strict sentencing guidelines have the 
potential to upset the balance of sentencing power; legislators, judges, and 
scholars in some guidelines systems fear that charging and plea bargaining 
practices allow the parties, and particularly the prosecution, to have too much 
influence on the form or severity of the sentence — a problem to which I will 
return. 
Simplicity.  The number and variety of sentencing goals listed above 
naturally tends to make the drafting and implementation of guidelines more 
complex.  Yet Minnesota and most state guidelines drafters have recognized 
that effective guideline standards and procedures must remain relatively 
simple.  The public and offenders must be able to understand the standards, 
and both the standards and sentencing procedures must remain fairly easy for 
courts and other officials to apply.  Highly complex rules promote errors and 
more disparity; they also waste scarce court and attorney time. 
To summarize, early guidelines reforms attempted to narrow the focus of 
sentencing to strongly emphasize uniformity and “just deserts,” and to promote 
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more rational sentencing policy.  The much broader range of contemporary 
sentencing goals demonstrates an important underlying truth, which early 
guidelines reforms (and some recent proposals) seem to have overlooked: 
sentencing policy is very complex, requiring compromise and careful 
balancing of numerous, often-competing goals.  Yet the basic concepts and 
rules must remain fairly easy for the public and system actors to understand 
and apply.  Designing a workable system to achieve all of these goals and 
values is NOT a simple task! 
III. WHAT HAVE GUIDELINES ACCOMPLISHED? 
Now that we have a better idea of the goals which guidelines systems are 
supposed to serve, we can turn to an evaluation of their accomplishments.  I 
have to preface these remarks, however, by admitting to you that no “expert” 
on sentencing guidelines can tell you very much about how most state 
guidelines systems have worked in practice.  In some cases, this is because a 
state’s system is too new to have generated enough data for evaluation.  In 
other cases, the reason is simply that the guidelines commission has not 
published or commissioned any evaluations, nor is there some professor or 
other outside researcher who takes a special interest in that state’s guidelines.  
So keep in mind that much of what I put forth in this section is based on a few, 
well-documented systems, and some “educated guesswork” about the rest. 
Disparity reduction.  Since most guidelines systems have abolished parole, 
they have eliminated that form of disparity.  Judicial sentencing disparities 
have also been reduced, at least in the few states that have been evaluated.  
Minnesota is the only system to have been subjected to extensive outside 
evaluation, but data reported by sentencing commissions or their staffs suggest 
that disparity has also been reduced in Delaware, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington.5  It is possible, of course, that judicial sentencing disparities were 
simply replaced by prosecutorial disparities.  Most evaluations of state 
sentencing guidelines have only examined disparity on the basis of the 
conviction offense, since that is what state guideline rules are based on, but 
evaluation of prosecutorial disparity requires analysis of “real offense” data.6    
You will note that two of these five data-reporting jurisdictions do not 
have legally-binding guidelines (Delaware’s are formally voluntary, and 
Pennsylvania’s lack effective appellate review).  Although much more research 
is needed on this point, it may be that voluntary judicial guidelines can still be 
effective to reduce disparity, at least if certain other factors are present: 
 
 5. Tonry, supra note 1, at 153-54. 
 6. For some examples of such analysis, see Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-
Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL. 279, 299-303, 318 n.93, 321 (1993).  For further discussion of prosecutorial 
discretion and plea bargaining, see part IV, infra. 
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Delaware is a very small state, with substantial informal “peer” pressure on 
judges to conform to the guidelines; Pennsylvania has had a very strong and 
active sentencing commission. 
More rational sentencing policy.  As shown in the table, most guidelines 
systems include a permanent sentencing commission.  Although some are more 
active than others, all of these commissions have begun to develop useful 
sentencing policy expertise, a comprehensive statewide view of punishment 
priorities, better management of resources, and a long-term perspective.  Even 
in states with fairly weak guidelines, sentencing commissions can play an 
important role, not just in drafting guidelines but also by advising the 
legislature as to various sentencing policy matters of current concern. 
As for the increasingly important goal of resource-impact assessment, 
there is considerable evidence that sentencing guidelines can help to avoid 
prison overcrowding and the kinds of dramatic (and very expensive) escalation 
in prison populations which has occurred in many non-guidelines states in the 
past fifteen years.  Minnesota pioneered this concept and has successfully 
avoided major prison overcrowding problems for almost two decades — a 
period in which most non-guidelines states experienced both overcrowding and 
court intervention.  Although Minnesota’s prison population has increased 
substantially since 1979, the average annual rate of growth (about five percent 
per year) has only been about two-thirds the rate for the nation as a whole 
(eight percent per year).  Other guidelines jurisdictions which emphasized 
resource-management goals have also had low average annual growth rates, 
comparable to Minnesota’s.  But average growth rates in guidelines systems 
without these goals were higher (seven percent), and one of the highest average 
rates of prison population growth in any system, with or without guidelines, 
occurred in the federal system  — about nine percent per year. 
Two other goals closely related to the goal of resource management are the 
development of detailed sentencing and correctional databases and the 
promotion of greater use of intermediate sanctions.  Improved data permits 
more accurate prison population forecasts and more informed sentencing 
policy formulation.  Guidelines jurisdictions now possess by far the best 
system-wide data on sentencing practices and correctional populations.  When 
it comes to the promotion of intermediate sanctions, however, sentencing 
guidelines reforms have accomplished relatively little, for reasons I examine 
later. 
Another goal of rational sentencing policy is the development of effective 
appellate review, including a sufficient body of caselaw to enforce guidelines 
rules, clarify ambiguities, and develop sentencing policy through the time-
honored, “common law” method.  Many guidelines systems (Alaska, 
Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, Kansas, and the Federal courts) have 
achieved a substantial body of appellate case law.  Some observers believe that 
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appellate review in the federal courts has gone too far, however, unduly 
limiting trial court flexibility.7 
Truth in Sentencing.  Any system that has abolished parole release 
discretion — as the majority of guidelines systems have done — has achieved 
a greater degree of “truth in sentencing.”  Of course, this goal has also been 
achieved in a number of states that abolished parole without adopting judicial 
sentencing guidelines.  There are three reasons to believe, however, that the 
abolition of parole works much better in a system with such guidelines.  First, 
systems with judicial guidelines have less need to rely on state-wide parole 
standards as a means of reducing disparity in the sentences imposed by local 
judges.  Second, judicial guidelines can be used to encourage judges to lower 
their sentence lengths, to reflect the much higher proportion of the prison term 
that will be served after parole is abolished (and thus avoid massive increases 
in prison populations).  Third, systems with guidelines and a permanent 
sentencing commission are in a better position to predict the effects abolition 
of parole will have on prison populations; such systems can then either build 
more prisons, modify the guidelines to lower prison commitment or duration 
rates, or pursue a combination of these strategies.  In contrast, the abolition of 
parole, in a system without judicial guidelines, eliminates a means of 
counteracting judicial disparity and prison overcrowding at the back end of the 
sentencing process, without providing any means of controlling these problems 
from the front end. 
Public Safety. States with sentencing guidelines systems have generally 
had stable or falling crime rates since their guidelines became effective.  Crime 
rates have recently been stable or falling in most states, however, with or 
without guidelines.  And, of course, crime rates depend on many social and 
economic factors in addition to sentencing policy; a thorough examination of 
the relationship between guidelines and public safety would thus be very 
complex  (and has not, to my knowledge, been attempted by quantitative 
criminologists).  But the stable or falling pattern of crime rates at least suggests 
that sentencing guidelines do not threaten public safety. 
Other goals.  As for the other goals of guidelines reforms described 
previously (that is, rehabilitation and reintegration, restorative and community 
justice, rewarding defendant cooperation, shared sentencing power, and 
simplicity), some guidelines systems have been particularly successful.  The 
Minnesota Guidelines have achieved greater uniformity, proportionality, and 
truth in sentencing, while retaining enough flexibility to take account of 
unusual offender characteristics and rehabilitation potential, local values and 
resource limits, and emerging punishment theories such as restorative justice.8  
 
 7. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison 
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1458-71, 1498 (1998). 
 8. See generally Frase, supra note 3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] IS GUIDED DISCRETION SUFFICIENT? 439 
By giving strong priority to the use of state prison space for violent and repeat 
offenders, while emphasizing jail and other community-based sanctions for 
less serious cases, the Guidelines promote public safety while avoiding prison 
overcrowding and unnecessary incarceration.  Finally, the Minnesota 
Guidelines allow sentencing policy to be significantly influenced by each of 
the major actors and stakeholders: the legislature, the Commission, trial and 
appellate courts, the prosecution and defense, crime victims and community 
groups, probation officers, and prison officials.  At the same time, the 
Minnesota Guidelines remain fairly simple to understand and to apply. 
Other state guidelines systems have not been as thoroughly evaluated as 
Minnesota’s, but what we do know about them suggests that many of them 
have also achieved a good balance in the areas described above.  
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the Federal Guidelines.  There 
have been a number of problems, some of which have already been noted.  
First, federal appellate review has been very active, depriving trials courts of 
needed flexibility.  Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission did not adopt 
resource management as a goal; thus, federal prisons have remained seriously 
overcrowded, and federal prison population growth has been higher than the 
national average—and much higher than in jurisdictions with guidelines 
systems that emphasize resource management.  Third, the Federal Guidelines 
provide only limited scope for and encouragement of the use of intermediate 
sanctions, and only specifically incorporate options that are alternative forms 
of custody (community and intermittent confinement, and home detention).  
Fourth, the Federal Guidelines not only permit, but often require, judges to 
enhance sentences based on conduct that was not charged, or for which charges 
led to dismissal or even acquittal; although some state guidelines systems 
include occasional elements of “real-offense” sentencing, no state guidelines 
system permits non-conviction-offense factors to play a substantial a role.  A 
fifth problem in the federal system results from severe mandatory minimum 
penalties and related guidelines provisions which, in the view of many federal 
judges, often result in unreasonably severe sentences.  Finally, the Federal 
Guidelines are NOT “simple” — the Federal Guidelines Manual currently runs 
to over 400 pages in the West version (not counting appendices); the length of 
the Minnesota Guidelines, at about sixty-five pages, is typical of most state 
systems.  To summarize: the Federal Guidelines are not well-balanced; they 
contain a number of very problematic rules, lack desirable features found in 
many state systems, and have sparked far more criticism than most state 
guidelines systems. 
IV.  TWO PERSISTENT CHALLENGES 
Despite the accomplishments of many state guidelines, there are a number 
of legitimate criticisms, which can be leveled at even the best of these systems.  
In this section, I would like to address two of the most important problems: (1) 
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the failure to effectively regulate prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining; 
and (2) the limited efforts to regulate the use of non-custodial (“intermediate”) 
sanctions.9  I will concede that each of these “gaps” in guidelines coverage is a 
problem, especially in some guidelines systems.  I argue, however, that these 
limitations are not a major problem in a well-designed system, and indeed may 
even be strengths, helping these systems accommodate important 
contemporary sentencing goals and values. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining 
Prosecutors in every American jurisdiction wield enormous “sentencing” 
power because they have virtually unreviewable discretion to select the initial 
charges and decide which charges to drop as part of plea bargaining.  Since 
guidelines limit the range of sentences available for a given offense, the power 
to drop or not drop charges is the power to select the sentence range available 
to the court (that is, what “box” on the grid the case ends up in).  Thus, any 
disparity in charging translates into disparity in sentencing.  Unregulated 
charging also makes it more difficult for the sentencing commission to predict 
future resource needs.  Yet no guidelines system has come up with an effective 
way of structuring prosecutorial sentencing power, and its potential for 
disparity and unpredictability.  The Federal Guidelines tried to mitigate this 
problem by requiring trial courts to consider certain alleged criminal acts (so-
called “relevant conduct”) whether or not such acts were included in any 
conviction offense.10  But this essentially lawless approach goes too far in the 
opposite direction—allowing sentences to be based on weak charges which 
were properly dismissed, resulted in acquittal, or were never even filed. 
What should be done?  Clearly efforts to structure prosecutorial discretion 
and plea bargaining should continue, especially by means of internal, 
administrative measures within prosecutor’s offices, such as written policies 
and review of decisions by supervising staff.  But we should not expect any 
major “breakthroughs” in the near future.  The absence, in all state guidelines 
systems, of any serious attempt to externally regulate prosecutorial decisions 
reflects the extraordinary difficulty of enforcing such controls in an adversary 
system.  This may yet be possible, but it will be very difficult—especially to 
impose lower limits on charge and recommended-sentence severity (since, in 
 
 9. Other common criticisms of guidelines are that they do not give judges enough 
discretion (or give them too much); that guidelines give too much weight to retributive sentencing 
goals (or not enough); and that they promote undue sentencing severity (or undue leniency).  For 
a refutation of these opposing criticisms, as applied to the Minnesota Guidelines, see Richard S. 
Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 10-33 (1993). 
 10. For a discussion of relevant conduct and its role in sentencing guidelines systems, see 
Panel Remarks 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 409, in this issue. 
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most cases, neither prosecutors nor defendants will appeal cases of prosecution 
leniency). 
I believe, however, that most state guidelines systems are valuable and 
workable reforms even if prosecutorial decisions remain substantially 
unregulated.  I have two reasons for this belief.  First, the absence of 
widespread complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state guidelines 
systems is an important sign, suggesting that closer regulation may not be 
needed.  Specifically, I am suggesting that, in a properly balanced guidelines 
system—that is, one with reasonable sentence severity levels and few 
mandatory minimum statutes, in which courts retain substantial sentencing 
discretion for any given offense (e.g., broad guidelines ranges, limited 
appellate scrutiny, and/or flexible departure powers), it is rare that 
prosecutorial decisions will produce sentences which judges strongly 
disapprove, yet are powerless to prevent (as often seems to occur in federal 
courts).  Second, prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining are valuable 
sources of flexibility and moderation in sentencing.  These discretionary 
powers permit systems to consider individual offense and offender factors 
which may not fit squarely within formal statutory and guidelines rules.  And 
of course, prosecutorial discretion also allows systems to tailor sentencing 
severity to the available resources and evidence. 
B. Intermediate Sanctions 
As shown in the accompanying table, only a few jurisdictions have 
attempted to regulate the conditions of non-custodial sanctions, or even to 
encourage broader use of such sanctions.  Even the few jurisdictions that have 
attempted to address these issues have not gone very far.  Several systems 
authorize judges, in certain cases, to substitute specified amounts of certain 
intermediate sanctions for custody; for example, sixteen hours of community 
service, or a day of home detention, might be substituted for a day of custody.  
Two states, Pennsylvania and North Carolina, have attempted to define large 
groups of offenders for whom various kinds of intermediate sanctions are 
appropriate.  These guidelines first classify penalties into three types: 
incarceration (prison or jail), severe intermediate sanctions (such as residential 
treatment), and mild intermediate sanctions (such as community service).  In 
some cells of the guidelines grid, only the most severe or the most lenient 
sanction type is authorized; in other cells, the sentencing judge is given the 
option of selecting among two (or even all three) of these sanction types. 
This approach encourages judges to think about alternatives to custody, 
and discourages them from imposing severe intermediate sanctions in very 
minor cases.  But the Pennsylvania and North Carolina Guidelines provide no 
guidance as to the choice to be made when more than one sanction type is 
allowed in a given cell, nor (when a non-custodial option is chosen), how much 
of that option to impose (for instance, what length of home detention or 
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community service).  These two systems also provide little guidance for the 
use of intermediate sanctions in response to violations of the conditions of 
probation or post-prison release. Revocations of conditional release account for 
a high proportion of state prison admissions in many states; judges and 
correctional authorities need a range of structured sanctions at the “back end” 
of the sentencing process, as well as at the “front end.” 
Thus, an appropriate question is “Should all guidelines systems develop 
detailed rules to regulate and encourage the use of intermediate sanctions?”  
Perhaps, but only if certain conditions are met (and thus, probably only in 
certain jurisdictions).  The following factors need to be considered: 
1. Are various intermediate sanctions available in most parts of the state, 
and are they adequately funded?  A number of state guidelines systems 
(Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Ohio) have sought to encourage broader 
use of intermediate sanctions through increased state funding for community 
corrections. 
2. Is there fairly broad field support for such guidelines?  In Minnesota, 
proposals to add any type of intermediate sanction guidelines have been met 
with widespread resistance from attorneys, judges, and probation officers.  And 
Minnesota’s experience has shown that, where field resistance is high, 
guidelines rules have been widely evaded. 
3. Assuming sufficient funding and field support, what is the probable 
impact of wider use of intermediate sanctions on prison and jail populations?  
Prior experience with other “middle options” such as pretrial diversion and 
boot camp suggests that broader use of restrictive intermediate sanctions might 
not greatly reduce custody populations, and could even increase them.  Many 
of the offenders who receive these new sanctions would previously have 
received less onerousness release conditions.  Any increase in the number or 
intensity of release conditions inevitably means an increase in the frequency of 
probation violations, and thus at least some increase in prison or jail 
commitment rates. 
4. Are this jurisdiction’s guidelines already fairly detailed?  Rules 
governing the use of intermediate sanctions make guidelines more complex, 
yet a major goal of most state guidelines reforms has been simplicity of 
application.  As I suggested previously, simplicity promotes better public and 
offender understanding and acceptance of the rules, and reduces errors of 
application.  At some point, the cost of further complexity outweighs any 
added benefits.  This is particularly likely to be true in the sentencing of less 
serious offenses. 
5. How much importance does this jurisdiction place on non-retributive 
sentencing goals?  Flexibility in the imposition of probation conditions permits 
greater individualization (to achieve crime-preventive goals), and a greater 
degree of “local control” (so that sentencing policy and the use of local 
resources may reflect important variations in local values and traditions).  Such 
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flexibility also allows sentences to more easily incorporate restorative and 
community justice goals. 
In light of the considerations listed above, detailed guidelines for 
intermediate sanctions may make more sense in some jurisdictions than in 
others; moreover, such guidelines inevitably make it more difficult to achieve a 
number of competing sentencing goals.  Nevertheless, all guidelines systems 
can and should seek to develop standards—and resources—to promote 
increased and more effective use of intermediate sanctions.  Even if detailed 
intermediate sanction guidelines are not deemed feasible or desirable, efforts 
should be made to develop general “equivalency scales” between days of 
custody and various intermediate sanctions.  Such scales preserve judicial 
discretion, while encouraging judges to substitute intermediate sanctions for 
custody, and guiding them in the choice of specific sanction amounts. 
CONCLUSION 
After two decades of state guidelines reforms, what have we learned?  
Here is a short list of the most important lessons which a review of this 
experience teaches: 
First: guidelines systems in a number of states have succeeded in 
improving sentencing policy and practice by reducing bias and disparity in 
sentencing; avoiding serious prison over-crowding; and ensuring that adequate 
prison space is available for the most serious offenders.  State guidelines 
systems regulate but do not eliminate discretion; almost all of the existing 
systems leave plenty of room for the consideration of unique offense and 
offender characteristics, crime-preventive as well as retributive sentencing 
purposes, local community values and resources, and emerging sentencing 
theories such as restorative and community justice.  Most state guidelines 
systems have abolished parole release discretion, which serves to achieve truth 
in sentencing; offenders serve most of the sentence imposed by the trial court, 
and there is no pretense that sentences are longer than they really are.  State 
guidelines have achieved more rational sentencing policy because they are 
developed and monitored by an independent, non-partizan agency charged 
with the responsibility of collecting detailed data on sentencing practices and 
resources, evaluating sentencing policy from a long-term perspective, setting 
priorities for use of limited resources, and developing a comprehensive 
approach to the sentencing of all crimes, thereby avoiding the problems of 
piecemeal reforms.  Although state sentencing commissions play a critical role 
in guidelines systems, guidelines in Minnesota and most other states allow all 
of the other major public and private stakeholders to have significant input into 
the development and implementation of state sentencing policy.  The 
legislature maintains oversight and ultimate control over major policy issues, 
and important roles are also played by trial and appellate judges, the defense 
and prosecution, victims, community representatives, and correctional 
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officials.  And yet, most state guidelines systems remain relatively simple to 
understand and apply. 
Second: the best state guidelines work better, in all of the ways described 
above, than any other sentencing system which has yet been tried or even 
proposed.  Quite simply, there is no realistic alternative as a means of 
accommodating all of the many important values and principles we want 
sentences to serve.  The prior indeterminate sentencing system permitted 
extremes of disparity that cannot be tolerated in a modern system of justice 
governed by the rule of law.  The unpredictable nature of indeterminate 
sentencing also prevented effective resource-management, and violated the 
public’s desire for truth in sentencing.  Similar problems of disparity and 
unpredictability would arise if any jurisdiction were to base its sentencing 
system entirely on a theory of restorative or community justice.  On the other 
hand, highly “determinate” sentencing regimes—narrow, legislatively fixed 
sentence ranges for all crimes, or mandatory-minimum terms for selected 
offenses—go too far in the opposite direction.  Mandatory penalties deny 
courts needed flexibility, and invite wide-spread (but inconsistent) evasion, 
thus making sentencing even more disparate, and greatly limiting the hoped-for 
crime-control benefits.  Systems of legislatively fixed penalty ranges for all 
crimes have also proved undesirable, and no such law has been enacted since 
the early 1980s.  Legislators have realized that it is very difficult to specify 
precise sentence ranges in advance and carefully monitor their implementation, 
nor does the legislature have the time or expertise to do this—that is what a 
sentencing commission is for.  Finally, as was noted earlier, the current trend 
to abolish parole-release discretion without enacting judicial sentencing 
guidelines is arguably the worst combination of all, because it eliminates a 
means of reducing judicial disparities and prison overcrowding, without 
providing any replacement for these important functions. 
Third: state sentencing guidelines systems are politically viable.  They 
have been successfully implemented in many states, and have survived—in 
some cases for almost twenty years, which is a very long time, given the 
extreme political salience and volatility of sentencing issues in recent years.  
These systems have survived because they work, and in particular, because 
they have managed to incorporate, and strike an acceptable balance between, 
the diverse values and goals of late-twentieth century American sentencing 
policy.  Of course, there are no guarantees of success; a number of state 
systems have been abandoned, and others have been substantially weakened.  
The success of sentencing guidelines is spectacularly “contingent” as to both 
place and time.11  Looking at the history of state guidelines adoptions, 
rejections, expansions, contractions, and abolitions, it is difficult to find a 
 
 11. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 160-62 (1991). 
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simple pattern, although several factors seem important: a “weak” system to 
begin with (Louisiana, Wisconsin), and ballot-box policy making (Oregon). 
Fourth: state guidelines continue to evolve and improve.  Newer systems 
are more likely to take advantage of the potential which guidelines provide for 
resource-management and the promotion and structuring of intermediate 
sanctions.  Older systems are better today than when they began, because they 
now openly recognize and incorporate the many, conflicting goals and values 
in sentencing.  Although early systems such as Minnesota’s were designed to 
implement a theory of “Just Deserts,” we have learned that sentencing is more 
complex than that.  To achieve the goals of simplicity and rationality, it is 
tempting to limit our sentencing purposes to retributive uniformity and 
proportionality.  But no American system has ever adopted and retained such a 
narrow approach, and it probably never will.  Nor should it. 
Fifth: sentencing guideline reform remains an area of state, not federal 
leadership.  This reform began in the states; state guidelines systems have 
improved over time more than the federal version; and most state systems have 
avoided the strong opposition that the Federal Guidelines have evoked among 
judges and sentencing scholars.  Indeed, the federal contribution has largely 
been negative; states have adopted guidelines despite the federal example, not 
because of it (and have even felt the need to avoid the term “guidelines,” 
because it seemed too closely associated with the federal version). 
Finally: state sentencing guidelines systems are diverse.  No two systems 
are alike, and there is no single “model” that can or even should be universally 
adopted.  Again, it would nice if sentencing reform was simple—if we could 
just look at the past two decades and say to legislators in every state: “Do this.”  
But sentencing, perhaps more than any other field of law and public policy, is 
closely related to the unique traditions, politics, and culture of each 
jurisdiction.  I continue to believe that Minnesota’s version is one of the best at 
balancing and achieving all of the competing goals and values of sentencing, 
and that other states should try to adopt it.  But every system must ultimately 
find its own way.  In any case, the great diversity of guidelines systems 
provides a rich menu of reform options and experience to guide sentencing 
reformers in other states—and in the federal system. 
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Summary of Sentencing Guidelines Systems (Fall 1999) 
Major Structural Features 
 




















Utah Jan. 1979 Since 1983   Since 1993  Some 
Alaska Jan. 1980  Mostly     
Minnesota May 1980       
Pennsylvania July 1982     Since 1994  
Maryland July 1983 Since 1996      
Florida Oct. 1983 Until 1998  Some 1994-98   




Since 1999   
Washington July 1984     Some  
Delaware Oct. 1987  Since 
1990 
    
        
        
FEDERAL Nov. 1987     Some Some 
        
Oregon Nov. 1989       
Tennessee Nov. 1989 Until 1995  Some Until 1995   
Virginia Jan. 1991 Since 1994 Since 
1995 
 Since 1995   
        





Feb. 1993       
        
Kansas July 1993       
Arkansas Jan. 1994       
North 
Carolina 
Oct. 1994   Some    
Ohio July 1996  Mostly Some    
Missouri Mar. 1997       






























      
 
